Vorlesung: Algorithmic Game Theory - Details

Vorlesung: Algorithmic Game Theory - Details

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Allgemeine Informationen

Veranstaltungsname Vorlesung: Algorithmic Game Theory
Veranstaltungsnummer INF-3027
Semester WS 2024/25
Aktuelle Anzahl der Teilnehmenden 33
Heimat-Einrichtung Theoretische Informatik
Veranstaltungstyp Vorlesung in der Kategorie Lehre
Nächster Termin Donnerstag, 21.11.2024 12:15 - 13:45, Ort: (N - 3079)
Voraussetzungen No fixed prerequisites, but basic knowledge in the design and analysis of algorithms as well in complexity theory from the Bachelor studies will be assumed.
Veranstaltung findet in Präsenz statt / hat Präsenz-Bestandteile Ja
Hauptunterrichtssprache englisch
Weitere Unterrichtssprache(n) deutsch, falls gewünscht
Literaturhinweise Nisan et al.: Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press
Shoham and Leyton-Brown: Mulitagent Systems, Cambridge University Press
Roughgarden: 20 Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press
Easley and Kleinberg: Networks, Crowds and Markets, Cambridge University Press
Brandt et al.: Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge University Press
ECTS-Punkte 8

Räume und Zeiten

(N-3079)
Dienstag: 12:15 - 13:45, wöchentlich (15x)
Donnerstag: 14:00 - 15:30, wöchentlich (14x)
(N - 3079)
Donnerstag: 12:15 - 13:45, wöchentlich (15x)

Modulzuordnungen

Kommentar/Beschreibung

Algorithmic Game Theory is a young and thriving research area in the intersection of Mathematics, Algorithmics and Economics. Motivated by the rise of the Internet and its related new kinds of problems, Algorithmic Game Theory was established within the last two decades to tackle classical problems from Game Theory with an algorithmic perspective.

Among others we will discuss the following questions:
- How can we solve assignment problems (e.g. assigning talks/projects to students) such that all participants are happy with their assignment?
- Are there auctions in which all bidders want to bid honestly?
- How does the perfect voting system look like?
- Does every game have an equilibrium, that is, an outcome in which all players are happy?
- Is it easy to find an equilibrium for a specific game?
- How good/bad are equilibria reached via egoistic behavior compared to the best centrally enforced solution?

Answers to the above questions have been awarded with 7 "Nobel Prices" in Economics (most recently, the 2020 Economics Nobel Price!) and some of the most prestigious awards in Mathematics and Computer Science.